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I. INTRODUCTION

Faraway from the frightening attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, a wall next to a mosque in Northern England reads, "Avenge USA kill a Muslim now."' The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, although
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Peter Ford, Xenophobia Follows US Terror; Amnesty InternationalSays Government Curbs On
Immigration Are Adding to the Anti-Arab Backlash, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 11, 2001, at 4
(hereinafter Ford, Xenophobia].
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launched against the United States, have left no comer of the world untouched.
Even in Europe, the acts of violence have incited a "swelling mood of
xenophobia., 2 Far right parties have drawn on the attacks to renew their
campaigns against foreigners and refugees.3 In response, national governments
are tightening their immigration policies in the name of fighting international
4
terrorism.
Likewise, the European Union ("EU") institutions are proposing increased
control of external borders.' The institutions are pushing for greater autonomy
by the EU in order to ensure that the border policies of member nations are
uniform.6 The appeal to increased control, however, is not a complete change
from previous policy. Since the oil crisis of the 1970's created an economic
scare, Europe has more or less closed its door to primary immigration. 7
Moreover, increased migration due to political instability and the extreme
poverty of neighboring countries has also contributed to the fear that floods of
refugees to the EU would deplete the supply of jobs in Europe. 8 Most recently,
the war in Bosnia and United States presence in Afghanistan have resulted in a
large flood of refugees to safe havens in the EU, arousing xenophobia and
contributing to the move toward stricter, more uniform policies.9
2.
Id. Moroccans in Madrid, Spain complain of increased affronts by police after September 11 th;
police have marched into Moroccan establishments asking for immigration papers and throwing anyone who
cannot produce them in jail. id. Mosques in the Netherlands have been covered with graffiti and firebombed,
while in Sweden, Britain, and the Netherlands, a handful of people from Islamic countries have been
physically assaulted. Geoff Winestock, Attack on America: Relaxation of Immigration Rules Is Put On Hold
Following the Attacks On the U.S., EuropeansRetreat From Moves to Change Asylum, Refugee Status, WALL
ST. J. EUR., Oct. 8, 2001, at 12[hereinafter Winestock].
3.
Winestock, supra note 2, at 12.
4.
Id.; Andrew Borowiec, Europe Tightens Arab Migration Rules; Tunisian Symposium Cites
Deepening Social Rift
Across MediterraneanSea, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at A12. In Britain, the
government announced "new measures to clamp down on illegal immigrants" in early October 1999, raising
concern that the fight against terrorism will impede on the refugees' ability to seek asylum. Ford, Xenophobia,
supra note 1,at 4. The German Interior Minister, Otto Schilly, delayed debate on a non-refugee status bill,
determining that it needed to be "reevaluated." Winestock, supra note 2, at 12. The leader of the National
Front in France called for creation of a national guard to stop crime in cities with large migrant populations.
Id.
5.
See infra Part II.C.
6.
See infra Part B.C.
7.
F.T. McCarthy, Go For It: Many European Countries Are Getting Hot Under the Political
Collar About Immigration. Yet in Truth, the European Union Needs More Immigrants, Not Fewer,
ECONOMIST, May 6, 2000, at 1,availableat 2000 WL 8141841 [hereinafter McCarthy]. Primary immigrants
are economic migrants who are the first members of their families to settle in a particular country. Id. In
contrast, secondary immigrants migrate to a country to reunite with their families. Id. The EU members
continue to permit secondary immigrants to enter their countries. Id.
8.
JOHN HANDOLL, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS INTHE EU 352 (1995).
9.
Nathan A. Adams, IV, Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious Liberty Beyond the
Border, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 11 (2000); Peter Ford, Migrant Crisis Divides Europe; Britain and France

20031

Halliday-Roberts

Disparate immigration policies among the nations of the EU have
prompted third country immigrants' ° to attempt to enter through nations with the
laxest border policies, creating additional controversy among the member
nations." The French government, in particular, has requested that Britain
toughen its treatment of asylum applicants in order to prevent asylum shopping
among the nations of the EU.' 2 France has established a camp outside of the
English Channel to house the growing number of refugees lining up at Britain's
gates in order to take advantage of more lenient policies, and the French Interior
Minister appealed to the English government to harmonize its immigration
3
legislation in order to make the country less attractive to asylum seekers.'
Europe has thus pushed for greater centralization of immigration policies. 4
Although the member states currently maintain control of immigration matters
through intergovernmental action in the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the
EU, thirteen member states have voluntarily unified their immigration policies
through the Schengen Agreement.' 5 Nonetheless, voluntary uniformity through
regional cooperation is inherently different than ceding control to an
increasingly supranational institution via centralization.' 6
This paper analyzes the impact of the EU' s effort to unify the immigration
law of its member states by vesting more power in its institutions. Specifically,
this Paper addresses the vital role that third country immigration matters play
in a nation's sovereignty and the importance of respecting that sovereignty
when considering centralization of immigration law under an international
regime. Following this Introduction, Part II of this paper briefly discusses the
history and development of immigration law in the EU and the origins of the
move toward federalism, as well the recent proposals of the EU institutions to
centralize control of the nations' external borders.17
Part Im1 compares the impact of centralization with the effect of
decentralization on immigration policies and juxtaposes the EU with a
Fight as 390,000 Immigrants PerYear- 10 Times the US Rate -Seek Asylum in Europe, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

MONITOR, Sept. 7, 2001, at I [hereinafter Ford, Migrant Crisis].
10.
The term "third country immigrants" refers to persons from non-member states seeking
admission into an EU member state. This Paper primarily focuses on third country immigration, rather than
immigration within the EU. Internal immigration is only discussed in order to explain the EU's desire to unify
external immigration policies as a means of facilitating immigration between members of the EU.
Ford, Migrant Crisis,supra note 9, at I (asserting that "illegal immigrants say they are attracted
1I.
by the relative leniency of British asylum procedure, the lure of jobs, the lack of ID cards which makes it
easier to hide - as well as the other Afghans and Iraqis already living in England").
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part ll.A and U.B.
15.
16.
See infra Part 1m1.C.
17.
See infra Part II (outlining immigration law in the EU).
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federation that has successfully federalized immigration law, the United States.' 8
Part IV proposes a decentralized approach to control of external borders in order
to protect national sovereignty, history, and culture while permitting countries
to achieve uniformity via international agreements.' 9 Furthermore, Part IV
explores the benefits of targeting the root cause of immigration, rather than
merely attempting to correct immigration after the fact by fortifying external
borders.2" This approach balances the countries' interest in national sovereignty
with the EU's interest in achieving free movement across internal borders
because it allows the nations to control their own immigration policies while
retaining the option to enter into regional agreements without ceding complete
control to an increasingly supranational authority. 2
11. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW INTHE EU
This section analyzes the foundation and history of immigration law as it
has developed in the EU. A review of the evolution of immigration law is
important in order to provide the necessary framework for understanding current
developments and concerns. The first subpart begins by discussing the origins
of the EU and the development of immigration policies in the face of
centralization.22 The second subpart then examines the current status of
immigration law and the future trends in the EU.23
A. Immigration Law Eludes Centralization
Although the EU had modest beginnings, originating with the European
Coal and Steel Community,24 it has evolved into an expansive community with
fifteen member nations.25 The Treaty of Rome ("Treaty") forms the cornerstone

See infra Part 1M(discussing benefits and burdens of centralization and decentralization).
18.
See infra Part IV (discussing the decentralized approach).
19.
20.
See infra Part IV (discussing the eliminating of illegal immigration by targeting the root
problems).
21.
See infra Part IV (discussing the proposed solution).
See infra Part ll.A (discussing the origin of the EU's immigration laws).
22.
See infra Part II.C (discussing current immigration policies).
23.
24. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of Paris), Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 (entered into force Jul. 23, 1952) [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]; Barbara Crutchfield George, et al.,
The Dilemma of the European Union: Balancing the Power of the Supranational EU Entity Against the
Sovereignty of Its Independent Member Nations, 9 PACE INT'L L. REV. 111, 112-13 (1997). The European
Coal and Steel Community initiated the economic union of European nations when six countries joined
together to create a common market in coal and steel. ECSC Treaty, supra; I DAMIAN CHALMERS, EUROPEAN
UNION LAW: LAW AND EU GOVERNMENT 13 (1998) [hereinafter CHALMERS].
25.

DESMOND DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION?: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

5 (LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS, INC. 1994) (1957). The fifteen members include Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria,
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of the present union by creating the European Economic Community ("EEC"). 26
The EEC focuses on establishing a common market "to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic
activities ... ,,27
The Treaty has subsequently been amended on many occasions,
most notably by the Maastricht Treaty on EU ("Maastricht Treaty").28
In furtherance of the common market, the Treaty advocates the free
movement of persons across internal borders.29 Article 3 mandates "an internal
market characterized by the abolition, as between member states, of obstacles
to the free movement of ...
persons.... ,30 Moreover, Article 8 provides every
citizen of the Union with the right to move and reside freely within the territory
3
of any member state. 1
Despite the Treaty's promotion of free movement across internal borders,
regulation of the movement of persons across external borders has been reserved
to the member states, thus eluding centralization.3 2 Immigration and asylum
became key political issues during the 1970's and 1980's.33 Although the
economic expansion of Western Europe led to a tremendous increase in
immigration from third countries in the 1950's and 1960's, a slump in the
European economies as a result of a rise in the price of oil prompted tighter
controls on entry in 1973.' Further, the collapse of the "Iron Curtain" incited
fears of mass immigration from Eastern European countries and the former
Soviet Union. 35 The southern members of the EU also dreaded migration from

Finland, and Sweden. Id. For further discussion of the origins and evolution of the EU, see I CHALMERS, id.
note 24, at 5-50.

26. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 294 U.N.T.S. 17
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. "By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties
establish among themselves a European Community." Id. at art. .
27.
EC Treaty, id. note 26, at art. 2.
28.
HANDOLL, supra note 8, at 17; see also Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), Feb. 7,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter TEU].
29.

HANDOLL, supra note 8, at 17.

30.

EC Treaty, supra note 26, at art. 3(c).

31.

Id. at art. 8a (I). "Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely

within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty
and by the measures adopted to give it effect." Id.

32.

TEU, supra note 28, at art. K. I. Article K. I provides:
Member States shall regard the following areas as matters of common interest:
1. asylum policy;
2.

rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member

States and the exercise of controls thereon;

3. immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries....
Id.
33.
34.

HANDOLL, supra note 8, at 351-52.
Id. at 351.

35.

Id. at 352.
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North Africa.36 The events and ensuing reservations resulted in rigorous
application of asylum and refugee policies.37 Consequently, the Community
determined that immigration issues would be best addressed through
intergovernmental cooperation, rather than centralized action, as the member
states were unwilling to risk losing control of a controversial arena
domestically.38
The Maastricht Treaty thus divided the Union into three pillars: the
European Community; the Common Security Policy; and the Justice and Home

Affairs. 39 By vesting control of external immigration within the framework of
cooperation on justice and home affairs, more commonly known as the third
pillar, the EU institutions have limited authority over the field.4" The European
Court of Justice has no judicial review over the matters, and the role of the
European Parliament is weak.4" The primary control of third party immigration
rests with the individual member nations.4 2
B. Thirteen Nations Flirt with Unification

Rather than centralization, thirteen of the fifteen EU member states have
opted for a self-imposed unification of immigration policies on their external

frontiers.43 Originally, nine EU members entered into the 1985 Schengen
Agreement and the 1990 Convention applying the agreement (collectively, the
"Schengen Instruments"), pledging to abolish internal borders and to cooperate
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Amy L. Elson, Baltic State Membership in the European Union: Developing a Common Asylum
and Immigration Policy, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 317,328 (1997).
39.
See TEU, supra note 28, at Titles V, VI; see also Diane P. Wood, International Law and
Federalism: What is the Reach of Regulation?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 97, 100 n. 13 (1999) (discussing
the Titles establishing the three pillars).
40.
TEU, supra note 28, at arts. K, K. I& K.2. The balance of power of the third pillar tips in favor
of the Member States. HANDOLL, supra note 8, at 31. Although the Commission has the power of proposal
in conjunction with the member states, "it does not have the role of Treaty guardian." Id. But see TEU, supra
note 28, at art. K.9 (allowing the Council to bring asylum policy within the scope of the EC Treaty, or the first
pillar, thus vesting the institutions with substantial authority).
41.
Elson, supra note 38, at 329. Handoll writes:
The Court of Justice enjoys, with limited potential exceptions, no powers of interpretation or judicial review: its powers of review are restricted to the possibility of determining, as a matter of EC law, that the EC, rather than the Member States acting under the
CJHA provisions, is competent in a particular area. The European Parliament has
limited rights to be consulted: democracy is still to be seen at the national level.
HANDOLL, supra note 8, at 31.
42.
TEU, supra note 28, at arts. K. I & K.2.2; see also Elson, supra note 38, at 329.
43.
The Changing Face ofEurope, CNN.COM, at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/eurounion/
story/overview/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2003). (revealing that only Britain and Ireland have not signed the
Schengen Agreements).
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in an effort to enforce external borders." Their central objective was the
gradual abolition of controls at the common frontiers, similar to the EU's goal
of eliminating internal borders in order to achieve a common market. 5 To
facilitate the free movement of persons, the Schengen Instruments aimed to
abolish controls at the common, internal frontiers, as well as synchronize
controls at the external frontiers, by harmonizing immigration, visa, and asylum
policies; increasing cooperation in the policing of external borders and
enforcing laws; and establishing the Schengen Information System.46 Article
21 of the Schengen Instruments even recognizes non-EU nationals' right of free
movement within the Schengen territory once they have been admitted by one
47
of the members to the agreement.
Nonetheless, border checks may be carried out for a limited time period for
public policy or national security reasons. 4' France, in fact, has raised security
concerns as a justification for temporary reestablishment of some internal
checks that the Schengen Instruments abolished. 49 Additionally, Spain refused
to comply with an extradition order and threatened to suspend the Schengen
50
provisions on legal cooperation, preferring to control crime on its own terms.
Although the Schengen Instruments do not form a part of the EU system, they
have experimental merit and may pave the way for Union-wide integration.5

44.
Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Border, June 14,
1985, 30 I.L.M. 68 [hereinafter the Schengen Agreement]; Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement
of June 14, 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal
Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the Gradual Suppression of Controls at Common Frontiers,
June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 84 (1991) [hereinafter the Schengen Convention]; HANDOLL, supra note 8, at 51;
Giovanna I. Wolf, Efforts Toward "An Ever Closer" European Union Confront ImmigrationBarriers,4 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 223,225 (1996) [hereinafter Wolf]. "The Schengen Agreement of 1985 stemmed
from the earlier Saarbrucken Agreement of 1984 eliminating controls at the mutual borders of France and the
Federal Republic of Germany." Kerry E. McCarron, The Schengen Convention As a Violation of International
Law and the Need For CentralizedAdjudication On the Validity of Nationaland MultilateralAsylum Policies
For Members of the United Nations, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 401, 409 (1995). The Schengen
Agreement was named for Schengen, Luxembourg, the city where the parties signed it. EU Ministers Discuss
Common Visa Controls In View of Enlargement Article By Rafaele Rivais: "European Union Wants to
Reconcile Enlargement and Security", WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Oct. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL
29287738. Interestingly, the parties initially signed the Schengen Agreements, in 1985, in response to a wave
of terrorist attacks. Id.
45.
EC Treaty, supra note 26, at art. 7a ("The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of
progressively establishing the internal market .... "); HANDOLL, supra note 8, at 51.
46.
HANDOLL, supra note 8, at 5 1; Wolf, supra note 44, at 225.
47.
The Schengen Agreement, supra note 44, at art. 21; Wolf, supra note 44, at 225.
48.
HANDOLL, supra note 8, at 52.
49.
Wolf, supra note 44, at 226.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 225.
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C. The EU InstitutionsPonderCentralization
The Schengen Instruments' abolition of internal border controls posed
some problems for asylum policies, permitting asylum seekers who have entered
the EU to freely move from one member state to another and complete multiple
asylum applications. 2 Consequently, all members of the Schengen Instruments
signed the Dublin Convention in 199053 to prevent the phenomenon of asylum
shopping.54 The Dublin Convention creates a system whereby only one nation
is responsible for review of an asylum application, thus avoiding the pitfalls of
asylum shopping and "refugees in orbit," a trend created when no nation
considers itself responsible for review of any asylum application and instead
removes each applicant to a safe third country after every review.55 Eventually
all EU nations signed the Dublin Convention, which serves as the EU's main
56
instrument in the field of asylum.
In addition to the common asylum policy, in October of 1999, the
European Council met in Tampere, Finland to consider the need for a common
border policy in response to increased illegal immigration and the trade in
7
human, beings incited by the stricter border controls of the 1970's and 1980' s.1
The European Council determined that, in order to develop common policies on
asylum and immigration, it must consider the need for consistent control of
external borders to combat both illegal immigration and those who commit
crimes involving immigration.5
52.

Catherine Phuong, Persecution By Third Parties and European Harmonization of Asylum

Policies, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 81, 90 (200 1).

53.
Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum
Requests Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, June 15, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 425
[hereinafter Dublin Convention].
54.

Phuong, supra note 52, at 90.

55.

Id. Articles 4 through 8 of the Dublin Convention set out the factors for determining the nation

responsible for reviewing a particular asylum application. Dublin Convention, supra note 53, at arts. 4-8.
Article 4 requires the State where the applicant's family member is a refugee and a legal resident to review
the asylum application. Id. at art. 4. If an applicant possesses a valid residence permit or visa, Article 5
requires the State that issued the permit or visa to review the application. Id. at art. 5. Article 6 requires the
member state whose borders an immigrant illegally crossed to review the application, unless the immigrant

was living in another member State at least six months before making the asylum application. Id. at art. 6.
Article 7 provides that the member State responsible for controlling the alien's entry must review the asylum
application unless the State waived the need for a visa, and the alien subsequently applies for asylum in
another member State that also waived the visa requirement. Id. at art. 7. In the event that no member State
is responsible for examining the application based on the previous factors, the first member State with which
the alien files the application is responsible. Id. at art. 8.
56.

Phuong, supra note 52, at 90.

57.
Id. at 94; Europa-The European Union On-line, The Fight Against Illegal Immigration and the
Trade in Human Beings, at http://www.ue2002.es/Presidencia/plantillaDetalle.asp?opcion=3&id=588&
idioma=ingles (last visited Feb. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Fight].
58.
Fight, supra note 57
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In response to the European Council's mandate, the European Commission
issued a Communication on a common European policy on illegal immigration
on November 15, 2001."9 The Commission noted that, although a legal
framework for the issuance of visas, border controls, and illegal entry exists
individually in all member states and at the regional level through the Schengen
Instruments, all members must work together to effectively apply common
rules.6 ° The Commission asserted that the "common security system is only as
1
strong as its weakest point."'
The Commission further urged the Council to approve, as soon as possible,
an Action Plan to combat illegal immigration.62 It identified six major areas for
possible action: (1) visa policy, 63 (2) information exchange, 64 (3) border
management, 65 (4) police cooperation, 66 (5) aliens law and criminal law, 67 and
(6) return and readmission policy.68 Acknowledging the national efforts to
combat illegal immigration, the Communication stressed the need for a
European dimension to ensure further progress, asserting that immigration
regulations, particularly visa policies, facilitate the EU' s goal of free movement
of persons across borders while contributing to the prevention of illegal
immigration.69

59.
Europa-The European Union On-line, Commission of the European Communities,
Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Common Policy on
Illegal Immigration, at http:/a140.g.akamai.net/7/140/6631/f97fe6cO772571/multimedia.ue
2002.es/pdf/com200l_0672en01.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Communication From the
Commission]; EU to Intensify Controls on Illegal Immigration, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 15, 2002, at 2,
available at 2002 WL 13684581; Fight, supra note 57.
60.
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 10.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. at 11-24.
63.
Coordinated visa regulations facilitate the free movement of persons across borders, while also
contribution to the prevention of illegal immigration. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, supra note
59, at 11.
64.
Shared assessments assist in estimating the scale of illegal migration by compiling the number
of refused entries, apprehensions of illegals at the border or in the country, rejected applications for
international protection, applications for national regularization procedures, and escorted or forced returns.
Id. at 14.
65.
The Commission proposed a European Border Guard as a means of implementing high standard
external border controls. Id. at 17.
66.
Cooperation and co-ordination at the operational level will ensure coherence and consistency.
Id. at 8.
67.
A comprehensive and concerted approach to fighting illegal immigration and smugglers will
ensure an internal as well as external preventative effective. Id. at 20.
68.
Id. at 3. The EU, as an entity, may use its political weight to encourage third countries to fulfill
their readmission obligations. Id. at 25.
69.
Id. at 3, 11.
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Based on the Communication from the European Commission, the Laeken
European Council urged the development of an Action Plan. v° The Council
recommended the adoption of a common policy on immigration and asylum.7
In particular, the European Council advocated more effective control of the
external borders, determining that external border controls would "help in the
fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the traffic in human
beings. 72 Thus, the European Council directed the Council and the
Commission to arrange cooperation between the services responsible for
external controls.73 It further requested that the Council and member states
move toward a common visa identification system and review the possibility of
creating common consular offices.74
In response to the European Council's instructions, the 2002 Spanish
Presidency of the EU intends to "move forward in the formulation of a common
European policy on asylum and immigration" by considering the need for
effective controls at external borders.75 The President named fulfillment of the
Tampere Council's mandates as part of his six priorities during his six-month
term in office, spanning the first six months of 2002.76 Specifically, he supports
improvement in managing the control of the external borders in furtherance of
a common policy on asylum and immigration.77 In the field of asylum, he
proposes measures to apply the Dublin Convention more efficiently. 78 In the
field of immigration, he will encourage an Action Plan based on the
Commission's Communication on illegal immigration.79 Thus, although
immigration matters are currently reserved to the Justice and Home Affairs
pillar, preventing the EU institutions from exercising much control in the field,
the EU has indicated a desire to centralize immigration law in order to facilitate
control of its external borders.

70.
Europa-The European Union On-line, Presidency Conclusions, European Council in Laeken:
14 and 15 December 2001,at 12, available at http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/makeFrame.asp?MAX=&BID
=MEETING 76&DLD=68827&LANG=-I&File=/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2002)
[hereinafter Laeken Council]; see also Fight, supra note 57.
71.
LAEKEN COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 12.
72.
Id. at 13.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Europa-The European Union On-Line, Spanish Presidency Advocates "Facilitating Legal
Immigration" and "Avoiding Illegal Immigration", at http://www.ue2002.es/Presidencia/plantillaDetalle

.asp?opcion=3&id=650&idioma=ingles (last visited Mar. 06, 2002).
76.
Europa-The European Union On-Line, More Europe: Program of the Spanish Presidency of the
EU 7, at http://www.ue2002.es/principal.asp?opcion=3&subopcion= I&idioma=ingles (last visited Mar. 06,
2002).
77.
Id. at 8.
78.
Id. at 9.
79.
Id.
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II.

CENTRALIZATION JUXTAPOSED WITH DECENTRALIZATION

The evolution of immigration law in the EU lays the foundation for
understanding the current debate regarding centralization. This part of the paper
discusses the concerns raised by centralization and decentralization of national
law regulating third country immigration. 8° The first subpart examines the
implications of centralization and ceding control to EU institutions.8 1 The
second subpart analyzes implications of decentralization and retaining control
at the national level.82 Lastly, the final subpart discusses the United States'
experience with federalism in immigration law in an attempt to predict whether
the EU would benefit from a similar, centralized approach.83
A. CentralizationofImmigration Law Ensures Uniformity
The EU was founded, in part, because its members were willing to cede
their autonomy in areas where the individual countries were limited
functionally.'
The countries agreed to centralize power in Community
institutions because common action would be more effective than national
action alone.85 Recently, the European institutions have been using the same
justification for centralizing immigration law. 86
Centralization of the EU's immigration law is often favored based on the
notion that freedom of movement between internal borders will be compromised
if the external borders are not adequately and uniformly guarded. 87 Nations
would be unwilling to remove internal checkpoints if they were wary of the
persons crossing internal borders due to the lax border policies of other member
states. Consequently, nations would continue enforcement of visas and internal
identity checks and impede, rather than promote, free movement within the EU.
Even if the nations continued their progress toward freedom of movement
internally, despite the disparity of external border policies, the European
institutions argue that the external borders would only be as strong as the nation
80.
See infra Part III (discussing of the implications of centralization and decentralization of
immigration law).
81.
See infra Part IIl.A (discussing the implications of centralization of immigration law).
82.
See infra Part II.B (discussing the implications of decentralization of immigration law).
83.
See infra Part III.C (comparing the United States' experience with centralization of immigration
to that of the EU).
84.
1 CHALMERS, supra note 24, at 7 (revealing that "the Second World War laid bare many of the
functional limits of the nation-State").
85.
See, e.g., EC Treaty, supra note 26, at art. 5 (establishing the principle of Subsidiarity, only
allowing the Community to act in areas where its action would be more effective than national action).
86.
See supra Part Il.C (discussing the rationales of the Commission, European Council, and
Presidency for centralizing immigration law).
87. See supra Part IB.
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with the most lenient laws."8 Immigrants would enter the EU through the
country with the most relaxed policies, and then, once inside the EU, they would
cross successfully from one country to another without confronting internal
checks. Due to the heightened awareness of national security prompted by
threats of terrorism, centralization presents tremendous benefits by theoretically
ensuring that all nations apply the same policies. Member nations may then feel
secure in permitting entry from an internal border or a fellow member state.
Nations will feel confident that common, agreed-upon immigration policies will
prevent the entrance into their frontiers by terrorists and may even mitigate
economic threats.8 9
Nonetheless, the Schengen Instruments have demonstrated a workable
solution to the seemingly divergent aims of free movement across internal
borders and national control of external borders by creating a scheme for
voluntary uniformity without centralization. The countries that desire to push
forward with the goals of the European Council Treaty are capable of entering
into an international agreement, thereby allowing those who wish to coordinate
their policies to participate.9" At the same time, the countries that do not wish
to coordinate may refuse to sign the agreement and may continue to maintain
their own external borders.9' Thus, uniformity can be achieved through
international cooperation rather than centralization within the EU.
Britain and Ireland have maintained their own external controls, and
consequently greater internal controls, while the parties to the Schengen
Instruments have created common border policies in order to facilitate freedom
of movement internally. 92 Thus, Britain and Ireland have avoided any affect of
the policies of other nations by opting out of the Schengen Instruments.
Although Britain and Ireland have had to forego some of the benefits of the
Schengen Instruments, such as avoiding checkpoints on borders within the EU,
they were able to maintain their autonomy while simultaneously safeguarding
their frontiers. Likewise, the Schengen parties ceded a portion of their national
control over their borders to common control; however, they have benefited
from the lack of internal checkpoints within the Schengen territory, and they
also retain their ability to alter their decision and resume national control. 93

88.
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, supra note 59, at 10.
89.
See, e.g., LAEKEN COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 13 ("Better management of the Union's external
border controls will help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the traffic in human
beings.").
90.
See supra Part .B.
91.
See supra Part I.B.
92.
See supra Part H.B.
93.
Paola Michelle Koo, The Struggle for Democratic Legitimacy Within the European Union, 19
B.U. INT'L L.J. 11,

117 (2001) (citing Joseph H. Weiler, After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in Post-

1992 Europe, in SINGULAR EUROPE:

ECONOMY AND POLITY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AFTER 1992, at
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In addition to the fact that the regional agreements can achieve the same
benefits as federalization under the EU, centralization of immigration policies
is less than desirable because it usually results in a problematic "race to the
bottom," where harmonization is achieved at the cost of stricter immigration and
asylum policies.94 Even the Schengen Instruments reflect the trend: nations,
afraid of being less restrictive than the other countries, "level down [their]
regulations on entry and residence of aliens in order to avoid an unwanted influx
of immigrants and asylum seekers, attracted by more favorable conditions."9 5
Consequently, political refugees and economic migrants are deprived of a safe
haven based purely on political motivations, rather than national requirements.
In fact, many of the nations curbing their policies in order to remain comparable
to other countries may actually do so to the detriment of their own needs and
economy. 96 Any intergovernmental approach that induces countries to ignore
not only the needs of their own citizens, but also the humanitarian needs of
international refugees, must be avoided. Although regional agreements seem
to pose the same problems, they do not bind the nations as tightly as entrance
into EU treaties and further allow the nations to temporarily derogate from the
agreement for public policy and national security reasons; thus, the countries are
freer to craft and shape their policies to the dynamic needs of the world. 97
B. Decentralizationof Immigration Law MaintainsNational Sovereignty
While ceding control to the EU institutions in matters that the EU could
more effectively regulate, the nations specifically reserved the field of
immigration to intergovernmental cooperation rather than centralized action.9 8
The countries deliberately chose to retain the matters of immigration and
naturalization for national control due to the controversial issues surrounding
them. 99 Members of the EU are constantly confronted with the dilemma of
ceding control to the EU for common action at the cost of preserving national
sovereignty.'0°
1I,27 (William James Adams ed., 1993)). There has been "controversial concentration of legislative and
executive power in the center [of the EU] at the expense of the constituent units." Id.
94. Wolf, supra note 44, at 229.
95.
Id. (citing Aleidus Woltjer, Schengen: The Way of No Return?, 2 MAASTRICHTJ. COMP. L. 256,
259 (1995)).
96.
McCarthy, supra note 7, at I ("Because Europeans are not having enough babies and are living
so long, the European Union would need to import 1.6m migrants a year simply to keep its working-age
population stable between now and 2050.").
97.
See supra Part H. C (discussing the EU's increasingly supranational tendencies).
98.
TEU, supra note 28, at art. K. 1.
99. See supra Part N.A.
100. Patrick P. Griffin, The Delaware Effect: Keeping the Tiger in its Cage. The European
Experience of Mutual Recognition in FinancialServices, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 337, 352 (2001) ("The EU by
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A nation's ability to define its own immigration and naturalization policies
third-country with respect to third country immigration is vital to its
sovereignty.'0 ' First, classification of the persons within a nation's own borders
directly impacts its sovereignty. Each modem nation "formally defines its
citizenry, publicly identifying a set of persons as its members and residually
designating all others as noncitizens, or aliens," thus determining who bears the
rights and obligations accompanying citizenship.'° 2 By retaining the ability to
establish which third country nationals may become citizens or legal residents,
the state specifies who is excluded from any claim to the benefits of
membership and who must incur the burdens and inconveniences of visa
restrictions.0 3 Thus, decentralizing the classification of third country
immigrants and maintaining control at the national level reinforces national
sovereignty on a fundamental level, a level that forms the very threads of a
nation, the citizenry.
In addition to classification of immigrants, nations must also retain the
ability to regulate the related matter of physical movement of third-country
nationals. A nation's decision to allow additional immigrants to reside within
its borders is vital to its ability to address the dynamic demands of its citizens
and economy. It is empowered to open its own borders when its economy
demands more laborers, and it is able to tighten its controls when its economy
is unable to support additional workers. Perhaps most importantly, it is able to
exercise discretion and distribute humanitarian relief when its citizens seek to
admit relatives from third countries and to close its border to outsiders when the
personal security of its citizens is threatened.'" Therefore, a nation must be able
to retain control over both classification of the persons within its borders and the
related matter of the physical movement of third country immigrants in order
to preserve its own sovereignty.
definition seeks to replace member state sovereignty with control at EU level.").
101.

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN NATIONALITY I (Randall Hansen & Patrick Weil, eds., 2001)

[hereinafter EUROPEAN NATIONALITY].
The importance of nationality law is beyond doubt. It gives institutional expression
to the state's prerogative of inclusion and exclusion: nationality laws define those with
an entitlement to a passport, and only those with such an entitlement possess the full
range of rights and privileges granted by the nation-state to its citizens.
Id.
102. ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 21 (1992)
[hereinafter BRUBAKER] ("These rights and obligations define a region of legal equality-what T.H. Marshall
called the 'basic human equality associated with ...
full membership of a community."'); see also Swedish
Justice MinisterOpposes the Idea of Common EU Border Police, BBC MONITORING, Feb. 19,2002, available
at 2002 WL 14251275 (revealing that the Swedish Justice Minister, Thomas Bodstroem, stated, "I believe
police activity is a national issue and that we should retain national control").
103. EUROPEAN NATIONALITY, supra note 101, at 1.
104. Id.
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More importantly, a nation claims its very legitimacy by expressing and
furthering the interests of its citizenry.'0 5 The EU's principle of Subsidiary,
itself, supports the importance of the individual nation's sovereign role.0 6
Decentralization permits nations, rather than a supranational body, to implement
rules and actions at levels of government where individuals have greater
involvement and are more effectively represented.0 7 Local governments are
more accountable to their population than a supranational authority. 10 8
Likewise, the more distant the exercise of authority is from its subjects, the
greater the temptation to ignore the national voices. °9 In order to effectively
represent its citizens, a nation must be able to react when necessary to their
dynamic needs. If the nation vests control with a supranational authority, the
decision-making body will be distant and out of touch with the particular
requirements of a group of people with which it has limited or no contact. Even
if the supranational body responds favorably to the citizens' needs, the response
may often be considerably delayed due to the extensive chain of command
involved in changing the status quo of a complex institution. Thus, many
citizens will suffer while their country waits helplessly for the elusive approval
of a higher institution. If the nation retains control, however, it may quickly and
effectively respond to changing circumstances and more aptly avoid any
unnecessary harm to its people.
Decentralization of immigration policies, therefore, allows the individual
nations to maintain their identity by determining the persons able to obtain the
benefits and rights of citizenship and by reacting to the changing needs of their
citizenry and economy. More vitally, decentralization of immigration law
permits nations to effectively, and efficiently, carry out the will of their
citizenry. If the needs of their people demand uniformity across international
frontiers, the nations are empowered to enter into international agreements.
Again, countries that wish to engage in common border controls can enter
into regional agreements such as the Schengen Instruments. The regional
105. BRUBAKER, supra note 102, at 21.
106. EC Treaty, supra note 26, at art. 5.
107. W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law-American Federalism
Compared, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 61, 66 (1995).
108. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalismin the European Community
and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331,340 (1994).
109. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALEL.J. 2403,2472-73 (1991). Professor
Weiler states:
The primary factor is, at least arguably, that the European electorate (in most Member
States) only grudgingly accepts the notion that crucial areas of public life should be
governed by a decisional process in which their national voice becomes a minority
which can be overridden by a majority of representatives from other European
countries.
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agreements, perhaps unlike the EU treaties, allow the parties the flexibility to
cooperate in matters beneficial to them while granting them the capability to
withdraw when the best interests of their citizenry so demand. The Schengen
Instruments, in particular, have provisions that allow countries to derogate from
the uniform policies for public policy and national security ends, and many
nations have taken advantage of the provisions. Control of immigration law by
the centralized EU, however, contains the inherent risk of becoming
supranational law, constricting the countries from later withdrawing their
consent if domestic needs require it."o In an area as crucial to national
sovereignty as the determination of one's own citizenry and residents, a
complete cession of authority may be fatal to a country's own being.
C. EU FEDERALISM INITIALLY EMULATES UNITED STATES FEDERALISM
The federal government of the United States first began to claim control
of immigration law in 1875, determining that it should be subject to a "uniform
system or plan."' ' Recognizing that the Constitution delegates to Congress the
broad power to govern foreign commerce, the Supreme Court unanimously
determined that state control of immigration infringed on congressional
authority and therefore was unconstitutional."1 2 The Court has since repeatedly
affirmed the view that the federal government has plenary and exclusive power
to regulate immigration and naturalization, expressing great deference to
Congress and reluctance to interfere in controlling immigration.113 Thus, the
110.

Koo, supra note 93, at 117 (citing Joseph H. Weiler, After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy

in Post- 1992 Europe, in SINGULAR EUROPE: ECONOMY AND POLITY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AFTER

1992, at 11, 27 (William James Adams ed., 1993)). "With gradual integration, the intergovernmental role of
the EU has decreased while the supranational side has increased." Id.
11.
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875). "The laws which govern the right
to land passengers in the United States from other countries ought to be the same in New York, Boston, New
Orleans, and San Francisco." Id.; see also ROY L. GARIS, IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION 80 (UNIVERSITY OF
NORTH CAROLINA 1919) (1927).
112. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (establishing that Congress shall "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations"); Henderson, 92 U.S. 259 (invalidating a New York statute that imposed a bond or commutation tax
upon ships carrying foreign passengers); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (determining that Congress shall
"establish a uniform rule of Naturalization"); GARIS, supra note 11l, at 80.
113. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224-25 (1982)
("Drawing upon this power, upon its plenary authority with respect to foreign relations and international
commerce, and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders, Congress has developed a complex
scheme governing admission to our Nation and status within our borders."); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977) ("Over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete."); De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) ("For reasons long recognized as
valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors have
been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government."); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
765-66 (1972); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) ("It has long been held that the Congress has
plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics
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United States has deemed uniform immigration policy a greater priority than
individual state sovereignty.
Following in the footsteps of the United States, recent communications
from the European institutions have also signaled a move toward greater
uniformity on the external borders in lieu of national control. 4 The institutions
assert that centralized control of the borders will promote uniformity and help
battle abuse of the immigration systems." 5 Nonetheless, whether a uniform,
federal immigration system will suit the EU as well as it has suited the United
States is questionable.
Since their inception, both the United States and the EU envisioned a
central government of "limited" and "enumerated" powers." 6 Nonetheless, the
EU and the United States systems are immensely divergent beyond their
superficial similarity as federal systems. First, as the EU increases its
membership, a potentially tremendous disparity in income may exist between
the member states of the EU that is not present within the United States.
Although currently the EU is composed of rich nations with similar

which Congress has forbidden."); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (asserting that
immigration powers "are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference"); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419
(1948); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,711 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581, 604 (1889); Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Fla. 1994), aff'd, 69 F.3d 1094 (11 th
Cir. 1995) (pointing out that the Federal government's plenary control over immigration is not disputed).
Prior to 1875, the individual colonies and states individually regulated immigration matters. Robert J.
Steinfeld, Subjectship, Citizenship, and the Long History of ImmigrationRegulation, 19 LAw & HIST. REV.
645,647 (2001). Massachusetts passed statutes as early as 1701, preventing the landing of the "poor, vicious
and infirm," and requiring the master of each vessel to post a bond so that towns that received any "lame,
impotent, or infirm persons, incapable of maintaining themselves ... would not be charged with their support."
Id. Likewise, due to the view that a large number of German immigrants were "strangers" who were "ignorant
to our language and laws," Pennsylvania enacted a statute that levied a tax of forty shillings on "every person
being an alien born out of the allegiance of the King of Great Britain ...
coming into this province by land or
water" and twenty shillings on "any Irish servant or passenger upon redemption." Id. at 647-48. Maryland
passed an act requiring the masters of vessels "or others importing Irish Servants into this Province by Land
or by Water" to furnish twenty shillings sterling "per poll." Id. at 648. It was not until 1875 that the federal
government asserted sole control over immigration matters, finding that a New York statute requiring the
master of a vessel to post a bond to indemnify the municipalities of the state against any expense resulting
from immigrants was an impermissible regulation of commerce under the Constitution. Henderson, 92 U.S.
at 262-63.
114. See supra Part ll.C.
115. Paul Martin, Rising Flood: Illegal Immigrants in Europe Threaten Fortress' Borders, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at Al.
116. Thomas C. Fischer, "Federalism" in the European Community and the United States: A Rose
By Any Other Name .....17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 389, 424 (1994) ("It is no forced analysis to suggest that
[the Treaty of Rome's reservation of power to the States] was nearly identical to the notion (expressed in the
Federalist) that the U.S. central government was one of "limited" and "enumerated" powers.").
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economies,"17 many nations considering membership have very poor
economies. 8 Both Turkey and the Balkan states have a gross domestic product
("GDP") under $10,001 per capita."9 Turkey's domestic product equals merely
18.7 percent of the GDP of Luxembourg, the richest member of the EU. 20 In
stark contrast, in the United States, the state with the lowest personal income per
2
capita totals 51.0 percent of the richest state's income.' '
Due to the potential economic disparity between the nations in the EU,
some countries may need more workers and thus wish to increase immigration,
while others may wish to bar entry due to high unemployment rates.
Consequently, the lack of uniformity between the individual nations will make
centralized enforcement of immigration law undesirable. Although free
movement of workers across internal borders may lessen a nation's need to
import workers from third countries, it may not entirely eliminate the
requirement due to EU citizens' geographical preferences.
Additionally, although neither the United States nor the EU are fully
sovereign powers due to their sharing of control with their member states, the
nations of the EU have not granted it as much authority as their American
counterparts have granted to the United States. 22 American federalism is based
on a theory of dual sovereignty, granting both the individual states and the
national government simultaneous authority over their respective areas of
competence.123 In the event of a conflict, however, national law trumps contrary
124
state law, thus making national law supreme.

117. EU CommissionerTells PolandTo Accelerate Economic Reforms, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 18,
1996, availableat 1996 WL 4444863.
118. Central Intelligence Agency, Figure 1. Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (1997), available

at http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/products/hies/graphics/figureOIa.pdf (Apr. 8, 2002) (revealing that Turkey and
the Baltic states have a gross domestic product ("GDP") ranging from $3001 to $10,000 per capita).
119.
120.

Id.
Central Intelligence Agency, GDP-Per Capital, at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/

factbook/fields/gdp_-_per-capita.html (last visited Apr. 08, 2002) (last visited Apr. 8, 2002). Turkey's GDP
per capita totals $6,800, whereas Luxembourg's GDP equals $36,400. Id.
121.
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Accounts Data, at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/bearfacts/stbf/index.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2001) (last updated Oct.
24, 2001). The personal income per capita of Connecticut, the richest state, totals $40,870, whereas the

personal income per capita of Mississippi, the poorest state, equals $20,856. Id.
122.

Bradley C. Karkkainen, Comment, Conceptions of Fiscal Federalism: Dual and Shared

Sovereignty, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 571 (1996).
123.

Id. at 565.

124.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United

States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."); Karkkainen, supra note 122, at 565-66.
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Conversely, the EU is not currently a fully federalized system.125 Some
scholars have deemed it merely a free trade zone, 2 6 while others assert that it
is nearing federalism but concede that it has not yet arrived because the nations
have not created a dual sovereignty, permitting the EU to exercise control in
areas simultaneously with the member nations. 2 7 The EU does, however,
possess 8exclusive competence to preempt the laws of member states in some
2
areas. 1
The hesitancy to cede complete autonomous control to the EU institutions
is perhaps indicative of the key distinction between the EU and the United
States. The EU is comprised of individual nations, sovereign in their own right,
with each encompassing a distinct history and culture. 2 9 In stark contrast, the
United States is comprised of states connected with one another from the
moment of their independence or creation. The states share a common history
and a common identity. Their sovereignty tracks that of the federal system of
which they are a part.
Conversely, the individual members of the EU began their existence
independently of the Union. They have unique cultures, languages, histories,
political and social ideals, and ultimately identities. 30 In order to preserve their
unique attributes, qualities that make up their very being, the nations must
ensure that they maintain sovereignty in spheres directly relating to their
national identities. Thus, the member nations must maintain autonomous
control over their external borders. They must ensure that they do not lose
control of the ability to define laws that impact the fabric of their country by
granting central control to an entity capable of asserting supremacy over
national interests.
IV. DECENTRALIZATION PRESERVES SOVEREIGNTY WHILE LEAVING AN
OPEN DOOR FOR INTERNATIONAL, RATHER THAN SUPRANATIONAL, CONTROL

Due to the unique composition of the EU, centralized control of
immigration matters would have a devastating impact on member nations'
125.

Karkkainen, supra note 122, at 569.

126.

Lerke Osterloh, Harmonization and Public Finance in Germany and Europe, 2 COLUM. J. EUR.

L. 519, 529, 531 (1996).
127. Karkkainen, supra note 122, at 571.
128. CHALMERS, supra note 24, at 236-39; Patrick Tangney, The New Internationalism:The Cession
of Sovereign Competences To SupranationalOrganizationsand ConstitutionalChange in the United States

and Germany, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 395, 424 n. 115 (1996). "The most common form of pre-emption is that
of 'field occupation."' CHALMERS, supra note 24, at 239. "Where Community legislation occupies a field,
Member States are prohibited from enacting legislation within that field." Id.
129. Leyla Marrouk, A Critique of the U.S. and EU Proposals For Improving International
Enforcement of Antitrust Law, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 101,123 (2002).
130.

Id.
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sovereignty. 3 ' A federation composed of individual, historically and culturally
distinct nations risks destroying the character of each of its members by forcing
them to follow a common approach to immigration matters.'
At the same
time, however, the EU is confronted with the dual dilemmas of achieving free
movement of workers across borders and of responding to increased
immigration from third countries.' 33
This paper proposes that the EU adopt a decentralized approach to third
country immigration.' 34 As already indicated, although centralization is
beneficial due to its uniform application in all member nations, it fails to
consider the individual needs of the participants.' 35 Centralization consequently
impedes the nations' ability to cater their policies to the dynamic needs of their
citizens.' 36 Furthermore, centralization of immigration law is inconsistent with
national sovereignty.'37 The proposed approach addresses the dual dilemmas of
achieving free movement of workers across borders and of responding to
increased immigration from third countries.3 8 It allows countries to participate
in a common regional policy while safeguarding their ability to impose their
own immigration standards by withdrawing from the policy when their internal
needs so demand.'39 Additionally, it permits the EU to tackle the issue of third
40
country immigrants by addressing the problem at its roots. 1
First, in order to achieve the aim of free movement of workers across
borders, the nations are free to enter into regional agreements that further
common border policies.' 4' By entering into regional agreements, such as the
Schengen Instruments, nations wishing to promote free movement across
borders may voluntarily take part, while those placing a higher priority on
autonomous immigration policies may opt out. Further, the regional agreements
do not pose the same risks of ceding sole control to a supranational authority
such as the EU. Unlike the EU, the Schengen Instruments create an intergovernmental agreement that achieves uniformity without centralization, rather
than a federalist regime.' 42

131.

See supra PartsIll.B & Il.C.

132.

See supra Part hI.B.

133.

EU Justice Ministers Open Two-day Meeting on Terrorism, Illegal Immigration, AGENCE

FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 14, 2002, availableat 2002 WL 2340020.
134.

See infra Part IV.

135.

See supra Parts I1.A & m.B.

136.

See supra Part ll.B &

137.

See supra Part Ill.B.

138.

See infra Part IV.

139.

See infra Part IV.

140.

See infra Part IV.

141.

See e.g., Schengen Agreement, supra note 44.

142.

Ricou Heaton, The European Community After 1992: The Freedom ofMovement of People and

M.C.

Its Limitations, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 643,655-56 (1992).
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More importantly, the flexibility of joining a regional agreement allows
nations to balance their own needs with their goal of achieving free movement
across borders. A nation with a booming economy may avoid signing a
common immigration agreement in order to import immigrants capable of
satisfying its labor demand. Further, a nation that has entered into the
intergovernmental agreement may temporarily derogate from the uniform
policies in order to promote public policy or national security like many nations
have already done under the Schengen Instruments. The individual requirements
of the EU member nations make centralization, under a potentially supranational
regime, ineffective.' 43 Unlike the United States, the EU nations may potentially
have extremely divergent economies and require varying amounts of immigrants
to satisfy their labor demand.'"
Second, in order to respond to immigration from third countries, EU
members should rely on individual schemes or a regional scheme. Again, each
nation may tailor its scheme to its own immigration demands or choose to align
with other nations with similar goals. Although a centralized immigration
scheme will ensure uniform policies, it will not deter illegal immigrants. One
key example of the failure of a central scheme to deter undocumented migrants
is the United States' experience: illegal immigration became an issue
immediately after the country sought to curb entrance and has since become
more overwhelming. 45
'
Undocumented immigrants most often immigrate to a particular country
due to the economic possibilities it presents.'46 Thus, a "fortress Europe" is
unlikely to deter most would-be immigrants. 1"' Instead, the EU should use its
muscle to target the root problems of immigration. The EU should take steps
to assist third countries economically; by improving the economies of third
countries responsible for the immigrants, the EU will spare its own economy the
pressure of illegal immigration. 41 8 Persons whose current economy presents the
149
same possibilities as the EU would have no incentive to immigrate.
143. See supra Part m.C.
144. See supra notes 117-20 (discussing the disparity of GDP per capita between potential member
states of the EU and the current member states).
145. U.S. Department of Justice - Immigration and Naturalization Service, Illegal Alien Resident
Population,at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/illegalalien/index.htm (last visited Feb.
19,.2001). As of October 1996, the INS estimated that five million undocumented immigrants were residing
in the United States, with the number increasing by 275,000 annually. Id.
146. Gilberto Hinojosa, Immigrants?It's the Economy, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 13, 2000,
at 7B (stating that "ultimately, economic forces control immigration").
147. McCarthy, supra note 7, at 2.
148. Wolf, supra note 44, at 228.
149. Some immigrants head to the EU to reunite with their family members already living there,
however, most illegal immigrants leave their home countries for purely economic or political reasons. The
Dublin Convention seeks to order immigration policies for political migrants. Dublin Convention, supra note
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In fact, the EU is currently attempting a similar approach with the
Mediterranean States. 5 ' By 2010, the EU and the Mediterranean States have
agreed to establish a free trade zone.' 5 ' In furtherance of the agreement, the EU
nations have agreed to invest six million Eurodollars in order to boost the
Mediterranean States' economies.'5 2 The EU can thus prevent illegal
immigration through means other than fortifying and unifying its external
borders.' 53 More importantly, the EU should not be tempted to shield itself from
the needs of the international community by failing to offer a safe haven to
international refugees. 54
Nonetheless, even though decentralization is more appropriate for
regulation of external borders and third country immigration, the EU should
continue its common policy in the narrow area of asylum under the Dublin
Convention. The Convention allows the nations to better address the needs of
refugees by coordinating the review of applications and avoiding the temptation
to deny responsibility for review. Further, the Convention prevents refugees
from completing multiple asylum applications in various countries. Because
asylum law is a reflection of a nation's responsibility to the international
community, rather than the needs of its citizens and economy, it does not raise
the same sovereignty concerns as other third party immigration. Thus, the
Dublin Convention contains none of the vices of centralization, but it accords
the benefit of uniformity. The EU, therefore, should avoid centralization of
immigration matters with the exception of the narrow area of asylum law.
V. CONCLUSION

By simultaneously decentralizing immigration law and addressing the root
problems of third country immigration, the EU nations can retain an integral
150. EU To Offer Aid To Brake Illegal Immigration, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 8, 1999, at 1,
available at 1999 WL 25102276; Wolf, supra note 44, at 228.
151. Wolf, supra note 44, at 228. The participating Mediterranean States are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, plus the Palestinian autonomous
Territories. Id. at 228 n.33.
152. Id. at 228.
153. Some scholars argue that Europe does not have enough immigrants and thus does not need to
create a common frontier in order to strengthen it border policies. McCarthy, supra note 7, at 1. McCarthy
writes:
Because Europeans are not having enough babies and are living so long, the European
Union would need to import 1.6m migrants a year simply to keep its working-age
population stable between now and 2050. With Europe's unemployment now falling,
and its people increasingly sniffy about the sorts of jobs they are prepared to do, or too
ill-equipped to do the high-tech ones being created, the continent's workforce is in need
of renewal as never before. Immigrants tend to inject into stale, ageing countries fresh
vitality, fresh energy and an uncommon willingness to work hard at unappealing jobs.
Id.
154. See supra Part Il.A.
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part of their sovereignty and tailor their immigration policies to the demands of
their economies. Currently, the EU institutions have indicated an increasing
desire to centralize immigration law. 55 They urge the creation of a common
border in order to combat what they perceive as a growing problem of illegal
immigration. 156 While centralization has the superficial benefit of unifying the
EU nations' external border policies, its burdens are severe.'57 Centralization
will compromise the countries' national sovereignty in an area that is crucial to
a nation's identity. 5 Centralization will also cripple the individual nations'
ability to alter their policies to suit the needs of a changing economy and
ensuing labor demands. 59 Furthermore, the Schengen Instruments have
demonstrated that a common border policy, if in the nations' best interests, can
be achieved through a regional agreement, rather than at the direction of a
supranational authority. " Most importantly, centralization will compromise the
individual nations' ability to provide humanitarian aid16to
international refugees,
1
by causing them to engage in a "race to the bottom."
This paper asserts that both the EU nations and their citizens benefit from
decentralization of immigration law. Nations wishing to advance the goal of
free movement across borders can enter into regional agreements, while those
whose economies demand diverse policies can regulate their borders individually. Further, the EU can address the problem of third country immigration by
considering the roots of the problem, rather than fortifying its borders. By
boosting the economies of third countries, the EU will benefit from lower immigration and the third countries will benefit from the investment. Consequently,
the EU will no longer be forced to choose between unifying control of external
borders and upholding the sovereignty of the member Nations.

155.

See supra Part ll.C (discussing the EU institutions' move toward centralization).

156.

See supra Part 1.C.

157.

See supra Parts UI.A & II.B.

158.
159.

See supra Part 1I1.B.
See supra Parts 111.B & M.C.

160.

Schengen Convention, supra note 44; see also supra Part I.B (discussing the Schengen

Instruments).
161. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.

